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MARK SPEECE 
Environmental degradation in arid and semi-arid regions often results from trade-offs 
between immediate and long-term needs. Ecological (and ultimately economic) benefits of 
restrained, sustainable resource use are well-understood by scientists, and are usually 
apparent to local farmers and herders as well. However, immediate economic needs often 
conflict, and excessive exploitation of resources may be necessary to subsistence producers’ 
survival. Such issues are illustrated in a variety of settings. Solutions to problems containing 
important economic components require appropriate economic policies, as well as technical 
action. Long-term sustainable resource utilisation rather than short-term exploitation must 
be made more attractive to local producers in their daily lives. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Environmental degradation is a very serious issue in most countries of the arid 
and semi-arid Third World. Fragile desert biospheres are easily damaged, but 
developing nations rarely have sufficient resources to cope with resulting problems, 
such as desertification. Part of the cause of desertification is undoubtedly broader 
climatic patterns, even climatic change [Hulme and Kelly (1993)]. But socio-economic 
and institutional factors invariably lurk behind a great many cases of environmental 
degradation. Often the real problem lies in the kinds of choices people must make 
concerning the environment. 
Such choices involve a conflict between long-term, environmentally sound 
decisions on resource use and short-term economic necessities that inhabitants face. In 
many cases, people at all levels, from policy-makers to small producers, recognise 
beneficial environmental policy and understand that their actions may be detrimental to 
it, but they may not have the luxury of following a beneficial policy. Food and fuel are 
requirements for survival today, even if the environment may be harmed tomorrow. 
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We illustrate these issues in a variety of settings: rangeland degradation in the 
Sahel; desertification from local agricultural development in Southern Arabia; 
deforestation for firewood in gum arabic stands in Sudan; and salinisation from large-
scale river irrigation projects in Egypt and Pakistan. Each of these factors which 
contribute to desertification differs widely, but each contains a similar economic issue 
at its core. This note examines similar kinds of hard economic choices behind these 
diverse physical desertification problems. 
Purely technical approaches to fighting desertification are rarely successful by 
themselves. Planting replacement scrub trees or repairing neglected terraces does not 
change the economics of the situation. New trees will be cut, new terraces will 
deteriorate, unless local people see short-term benefits in making sure that they are not 
cut and do not deteriorate. Purely legal approaches—setting up laws and regulatory 
structures—rarely help either. Arid and semi-arid landscapes are vast and sparsely 
populated and Third World governments lack resources. Laws and regulations cannot 
usually be enforced, as Ellis, Taylor, and Masood (1993), for example, noted for 
Pakistan. 
Of course, such technical and/or legal approaches may be needed as components 
of more comprehensive anti-desertification policies. But economic problems require 
economic solutions, and comprehensive policies must address the difficult economic 
choices behind man-made desertification. Technical and/or legal approaches alone 
cannot succeed without solutions to the economic problems behind actions which 
contribute to desertification. 
 
RANGELAND DEGRADATION IN THE SAHEL 
Desertification is a major continuing and increasing problem throughout the 
Sahel. Between 1955 and 1975, vegetation zones characteristic of increasing aridity 
shifted south by 150 to 200 km. in parts of the Sahel. The mean amount of land area 
classified as hyper-arid over the period 1961–1990 increased by 50 million hectares as 
compared to the previous 30-year period. Land classified as arid also increased by over 
3 million hectares [Hulme and Kelly (1993)]. 
Even though climatic change may be partly to blame for the advance of the 
desert, it is clear that modern pastoral systems in the Sahel are also a major factor 
behind desertification. One of the chief causes is rangeland degradation due to over-
grazing. Standard explanations of the process usually blame pastoralists for increasing 
herd size beyond the carrying capacity of available range resources. Livestock 
consume forage vegetation faster than it can regenerate, and eventually inedible 
vegetation or no vegetation at all remains. With degraded ground cover, soil erosion 
becomes serious and any chance of restoring the range becomes remote because of 
massive topsoil loss. 
A common variation of this explanation maintains that nomads cluster at wells 
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the wells and these individual areas of devastation gradually expand and link up. It is 
difficult to criticise this general model. The process has been examined in the Sahel 
and elsewhere countless times over the last several decades, and it does, in fact, usually 
proceed as outlined [e.g., Ormerod (1978); Solbrig and Young (1992)]. 
However, the question is why the process happens. Pastoral economies have 
existed in the Sahel for millennia, but serious environmental degradation characteristic 
of this century has not been present throughout all of Sahel history. In most periods, 
traditional economies were in much better balance with ecological conditions [Ford 
(1992)]. Solbrig and Young (1992) even maintain that traditional pastoral economies 
were much more productive than modern ones, while still doing far less damage. 
Rangeland degradation seems to have been a serious problem only during periods of 
severe social and economic disruption, such as have occurred in this century. 
Traditional trade, subsistence agriculture, and pastoral economies gradually 
disintegrated under the impact of colonial governments and the world economy. 
Farmers had to shift to cash crops to raise tax money or to buy what they formerly 
obtained through barter. Often cash cropping was imposed by colonial regimes to 
supply foreign markets. Farmers had to expand cropping into marginal areas to 
maintain food production, since prime lands were used for cash crops [Frank and 
Chasin (1980)]. Expansion did bring in extra cash or food in the short-term. Failure to 
expand would have meant less food and less cash. To farmers living at the subsistence 
level, less of anything often translated into the difference between survival or 
starvation. 
Pastoral nomads faced a similar situation. They also needed more cash for new 
taxes and to buy supplies they had once gotten through barter. Traditional means of 
raising some cash, such as the caravan trade, declined, but cash requirements increased. 
As farmers shifted to cash crops, they produced less fodder and grain, so prices rose 
rapidly. To adapt to changing economic conditions, nomads had to expand their 
economies, which, of course, meant increased herd size. 
But agriculture had moved into areas where nomads had formerly pastured 
animals, so the larger herds had to go to areas which were more arid and less suited to 
grazing. Sometimes wells would be drilled in the new areas to provide drinking-water 
for livestock, since it was difficult to find water year-round in these drier regions. 
Nomads began to concentrate their herds around such wells, because elsewhere there 
was no water and little for animals to eat [Ormerod (1978); Frank and Chasin (1980); 
Ford (1992); Solbrig and Young (1992)]. 
These changes in the pastoral economy brought increasingly rapid 
desertification. Planners began to decry the irresponsibility of pastoral peoples for 
“causing” desertification. But herders know perfectly well that areas they have been 
forced into cannot sustain large numbers of animals in the long run. They did not 
normally utilise these areas until forced out of zones where pastoralism was 
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very simple and very stark: die now, or attempt to carry on even though doing so will 
cause conditions to deteriorate in the long term. 
 
DECLINING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE 
IN SOUTHERN ARABIA 
Traditional agricultural systems in Yemen are based on capture of surface 
runoff. In the Tihama coastal plain, wadi spate irrigation systems divert flood flows, 
which normally occur only a few times a year during the rainy season. In wadi floors, 
an elaborate network of weirs and barrages directs runoff into canals for distribution to 
fields lying along wadi courses. Variations of these diversion systems are also used in 
the highlands, where linear terraces are constructed in wadis parallel to stream flow. 
Distributive canals channel water to these terraces, rather than to larger fields as in the 
Tihama [Bernhardt et al. (1981); Speece (1982)]. 
In the highlands, terraces are the most distinctive feature of Yemeni traditional 
agriculture. They consist of small, hand-constructed plots of flat land on steep 
mountain slopes. Terraces trap rainfall and runoff from upslope areas. This moisture 
allows them to be cultivated or used for grazing, so that terraces allow production in 
Yemen’s arid highlands which would otherwise go unused. Terraces are equally 
important for runoff control function. Peak flood flows are moderated, which both 
helps prevent damage to downstream spate irrigation systems, and allows more 
infiltration for ground water recharge. In addition, soil erosion is checked by trapping 
sediment on hillside terraces [Bernhardt et al. (1981); Speece (1982)]. 
In Oman most traditional agriculture utilises ground water. In the Batinah 
coastal plain, there are some spate irrigation systems in wadis similar to those in 
Yemen’s Tihama. But Oman receives far less precipitation than does Yemen, and 
agriculture is more extensive than just at wadi mouths. For most irrigation in the 
Batinah, draft animals draw water from shallow, hand-dug wells by means of a hoist 
and bucket. The water is dumped into a basin and channelled to fields or gardens. One 
well, with hoist and bucket operated by animal power, can produce approximately 
enough water to irrigate one hectare of land [Speece (1981)]. 
The interior of Oman also has terracing similar to Yemen. But much agriculture 
is in wadis and alluvial fans, and most irrigation water is obtained by means of a falaj 
(plural aflaj). Ghayl aflaj tap perennial flow below surface gravels of wadis (ghayl 
refers to this perennial flow). They use low bunds or short collector galleries to divert 
sub-surface water to terraced or cleared fields along wadis. Qanat aflaj, also known by 
many other names from North Africa to western China, consist of horizontal tunnels 
dug into alluvial fans. They tap the water-table in the upper reaches of the fan and 
transport it to the mouth of the shallow gradient tunnel much farther down the fan. 
From there, it is distributed to fields [Wilkinson (1977)]. 
All of these systems are compatible with the arid conditions under which they 
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the sea. Terraces prevent soil erosion, and by trapping runoff, allow more water to 
infiltrate to water-tables. Water cannot be extracted by hand from the shallow wells of 
the Batinah rapidly enough to deplete water-tables. Aflaj tap only renewable shallow 
aquifers for high-quality water, and are incapable of causing any rapid drawdown of 
the water-table. Many sub-surface flows could not practically be tapped at all by wells 
or pumps, and the water could not be used at all without ghayl aflaj. 
But traditional systems are labour-intensive, and both countries have 
experienced massive migration out of rural areas. The systems are deteriorating 
because there is insufficient labour to maintain them [Birks and Sinclair (1979)]. In 
Yemen, unmaintained diversion systems eventually become clogged or wash out. 
Terraces crumble and no longer prevent soil erosion. Eventually entire hillsides are 
stripped of any productive capacity. Even worse, without terraces, downstream areas 
are subject to increased flooding and sedimentation. This only hastens the decline of 
downstream spate irrigation systems [Bernhardt et al. (1981); Speece (1982)]. In 
Oman, water flow declines as aflaj deteriorate, and land irrigated by them may go out 
of production [Birks and Sinclair (1979); Speece (1981)]. 
Modern pumps only compound problems. In interior Oman, over-pumping 
lowers water-tables and leads to aflaj failure, so that even more pumps are required. In 
both the Tihama and the Batinah coastal plains, pumping leads to sea-water intrusion in 
coastal aquifers. Heavy use of pumped water for irrigation has caused serious soil 
salinisation, loss of agricultural production capacity, and then desert encroachment. 
Along the Batinah coast, for example, date-palm groves are dying because of salinised 
water, even though the date palm is a relatively salt-tolerant tree [Speece (1981, 1982)]. 
Most farmers understand these problems. Again, they face hard choices. Those 
who migrate know that traditional systems will deteriorate if they leave their villages to 
work abroad. We cannot really fault people, though, for wanting to improve the lives 
of their families and share other benefits of modernisation along with the rest of the 
world. Those who stay back have learned by now that pumping, where possible, draws 
down water-tables and leads to salinity. But without pumps, agriculture would have to 
be abandoned, because traditional irrigation systems no longer function. Then even 
more people would have to leave, and traditional systems would decline even more 
rapidly. 
 
DEFORESTATION OF ACACIA SENEGAL IN SUDAN 
Acacia senegal is a desert scrub tree, very well-adapted to arid conditions. It has 
a very deep tap root, but also an extensive lateral root system, making it quite effective 
at stabilising soil, preventing wind erosion, and trapping surface water runoff. It also 
produces gum arabic, a natural gum widely used in food processing and many other 
industries. While acacia senegal can be found throughout much of the Sahel region, 
Sudan is the world’s major producer of gum arabic, accounting for approximately 80 
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across the central part of the country, with el-Obeid as the centre of Sudan’s gum 
arabic trade [Pearce (1988); Anderson (1993)]. 
Some acacia senegal is actively cultivated, and sometimes it is used as a fallow 
crop or for intercropping. But the majority of gum arabic is collected from non-
cultivated trees. Recently, growing areas have declined as fallow periods are reduced 
and the trees become less important in fallow cycles. Where they were cultivated, land 
has been cleared for more profitable cash crops. But more importantly, outside of 
cropped areas, gum-producing trees are cut for firewood, charcoal, and building 
materials. Since the trees are an important component of the barrier against the desert, 
their loss not only cuts productive capacity for gum, but also aggravates the severe 
desertification problem [Hammer (1983); Pearce (1988)]. 
Because nearly all gum arabic is exported, and provides a significant portion of 
Sudan’s foreign exchange, the government attempts to control it. The Gum Arabic 
Company was created in 1969 and given a monopoly over the export of gum arabic. 
The primary concern has been government export revenues, not the impact of policy 
on the environment. Under the GAC, the government’s share of gum arabic revenue 
increased dramatically from 1970 to 1981. In 1970, it stood at 25 percent of export 
revenue. In 1981, the government’s share had reached about 54 percent. Serious 
declines in production may have been a key factor behind the reversal of this trend in 
the mid-1980s, and in 1987 the government share dropped back to about 41 percent of 
export revenue [Louis Berger (1983); Anderson (1993)]. 
As is the case for other government-controlled crops in Sudan [e.g., Speece 
(1985)], the prices producers receive stay well below free-market prices. In 1981, the 
el-Obeid floor price stood at £S 19/kantar [Louis Berger (1983), 1 kantar = 44.9 kg.], 
which was slightly more than four times higher than in 1970. This constituted only 33 
percent of export prices. By 1987, after the severe drought, floor prices were raised 
substantially, but only slightly offset inflation during the 1980s. But producers only 
actually receive these floor prices if they take their gum to el-Obeid themselves. Most 
gum is sold to traders who then transport it to the el-Obeid auctions [Louis Berger 
(1983); Anderson (1993)]. 
Pearce (1988) presents sufficient data for us to calculate estimated annual 
income in 1987 from one hectare. Assuming about 400 trees per hectare, and that the 
trees are equally distributed in age up to 16 years (maximum productive age), an 
average of about 52.5 kg. of gum arabic could be produced. At export prices and 
exchange rates prevailing in 1987, and assuming that they received about 40 percent of 
export price, producers may have received up to £S 330/hectare if they tapped all trees. 
After 1987, export prices were lowered by about 20 percent annually for several years 
because the GAC had misjudged the willingness of customers to pay higher prices 
[Pearce (1988); Anderson (1993)]. 
In addition to discouraging many producers, policies also discouraged traders 
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Sudan (the export port) were usually set to give very little margin above floor price. 
The net result of these pricing policies was that gum arabic production and trading 
became uneconomic for many producers and merchants. Gum production is down 
substantially from its peak in the years before the GAC took control. Despite 
tremendous capacity to expand gum arabic production, farmers and herders do not 
even tap many trees. Prices give no incentive relative to alternative unregulated crops 
or alternative activities [Louis Berger (1983); Pearce (1988); Anderson (1993)]. 
If low producer prices only resulted in not tapping the trees, this would not be a 
serious environmental problem. In practice, though, a tree can be worth more if it is cut 
rather than left standing, so that economic gain from producing gum arabic becomes 
small relative to using the trees as firewood, for charcoal, or for construction. 
According to Hammer (1983) acacia senegal is the preferred fuel and charcoal wood 
in Sudan. By the early 1980s, the value of the tree as firewood was more than five 
years worth of gum by the early 1980s. With firewood price rapidly increasing, 
increases in the floor price of gum arabic did not improve its relative attractiveness 
much. At prices noted above in 1987, it fared well, but in the following years the gum 
price declined while firewood and charcoal prices continued to rise [Hammer (1983); 
Pearce (1988)]. 
Surveys among villagers and herders in central Sudan [Hammer (1983)] clearly 
show awareness of desertification and of its causes, as well as the belief that planting 
more trees can help combat desertification. But subsistence level families on the edge 
of the desert must struggle each day to survive. If cutting trees helps people survive 
more surely than tapping them, they will cut trees. Pearce (1988) notes that production 
of gum arabic in Sudan is quite sensitive to producer prices. Clearly, protection of 
acacia senegal, which can be an important part of the barrier against desertification, 
depends upon prices small farmers and herders receive for gum arabic. 
 
SALINISATION IN EGYPT AND PAKISTAN 
In the previous discussion, the focus has been on decisions individual farmers 
and herders must face. Now, we briefly cite examples from Egypt and Pakistan to 
show that such tradeoffs between short- versus long-term actions also exist at the 
national level. Agricultural development in these two countries depended upon large-
scale irrigation projects on the Nile and the Indus rivers. Water-logging and salinisation 
became major problems because extension of canal networks and more frequent 
irrigation allowed vastly increased seepage from canals and increased infiltration from 
fields. Water-tables rose close to the surface, where they are constantly subject to 
evaporation, resulting in salt buildup [Wilkinson (1980); Varady (1981)]. 
The Aswan High Dam, put in use in 1960, enabled Egypt to add over 1.2 
million  feddans (1 feddan = 0.46 hectare) to cultivation by 1981. It also allowed 
perennial irrigation, so that fields could be cropped two or three times annually. 
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salinisation due to this extensive irrigation. By the early 1980s, nearly one-third of 
Egypt’s agricultural land had been affected to some degree. Average yields in the 
affected areas have decreased an estimated 30 percent, and some lands have been 
abandoned. The Egyptian response in recent years has been directed towards sealing 
canals to prevent seepage and installing drainage tiles below field surfaces to facilitate 
drainage. Such programmes are quite expensive and have required massive outside 
funding. 
Many had actually predicted these environmental problems before the dam was 
ever built. A few had even suggested that the kinds of tiles later installed should have 
been part of the irrigation expansion programme from the start. The predictions of 
environmental damage were borne out in the areas first reclaimed, but irrigation 
expansion nevertheless went forward. To understand why Egypt proceeded with its 
irrigation programmes when it was warned of substantial environmental deterioration we 
must look at the socio-economic context of the 1950s, when the decisions were made. 
Egypt was faced with a rapidly growing population. Agricultural output had to 
be increased if famine was to be avoided in the near future. Egypt had already achieved 
some of the highest yields per unit land in the world, so there were limited prospects 
for increasing production through improvement of cropping methods. Substantial 
increases could only come through expanding cropped area and cropping more than 
once annually. For this, expansion of irrigation was necessary. At the same time, 
Egypt’s access to major funding sources was severely restricted in the 1950s. In 
essence, the government was left with only one realistic option. It had to proceed with 
limited funding, which would not allow for expensive environmental protection 
measures [Waterbury (1979); Wilkinson (1980)]. 
Pakistan faced similar problems. Agricultural development depended heavily 
upon development of the Indus and its tributaries for irrigation. By the 1980s, it was 
estimated that nearly half of Pakistan’s irrigated land was affected to some degree by 
water-logging and/or salinisation; in Sindh Province the figure reached over 98 
percent. However, the government had to continue expanding irrigation in order to 
keep pace with population growth. 
Irrigation programmes continue with the full knowledge that they will result in 
water-logging and salinisation. In fact, nearly 40 percent of the funds for water 
development in the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978–1983) were allocated for drainage and 
reclamation of waterlogged and salinised land, while irrigation received just over 25 
percent of those funds. Over 100,000 tube-wells were installed from the early 1960s to 
the early 1980s in an effort to pump out ground water rapidly enough to lower the 
water-tables. Even today, salinisation from irrigation remains a serious problem. But 
just as in Egypt, it is doubtful that any other options are open to Pakistan. To cut back 
on irrigation expansion would mean that agricultural production would rapidly fall 
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CONCLUSION 
The examples discussed here illustrate that very similar kinds of economic 
choices lie behind very many different causes of desertification. Herders, farmers, and 
government officials are usually well-aware that their actions may contribute to 
environmental degradation. But they often have little choice, because solutions which 
are sound for long-term resource management may not address short-term problems of 
survival. We cannot condemn rural people’s desire to survive or even to improve their 
lives, and neither can we fault policy-makers’ attempts to help them do so. 
Rather, policy-makers must recognise that good environmental policy must 
address economic issues to have any chance of successful implementation. People will 
not support programmes which do not improve their lives. In fact, they will actively 
oppose programmes which actually cause a decline in living standards. The best way to 
get short-term cooperation in sound management of fragile arid ecosystems is to 
incorporate economic measures so that good practice leads to immediate benefits. 
Environmental policies will be supported with enthusiasm if they improve peoples’ 
lives now, not just in some vague, distant future. 
The first step in formulating sound policy is analysing economic motivations 
within the socio-economic context where people make choices. For example, livestock 
herds represent income and savings in traditional nomadic economies of the Sahel and 
Sudan. Production of animal products is both for consumption and for market sale to 
obtain what the nomadic economy cannot produce. Live animals also represent stored 
wealth, an insurance against hard times in the future. Nomads want to increase herd 
size because that is how a family’s living standard and security are improved. Farmers 
who keep livestock have similar considerations. Even though less dependent on 
livestock overall, increasing herds may be one of the only ways to improve living 
standards, because often there is too little and too poor land to gain much by expanding 
farming. 
In overpopulated agricultural areas such as Egypt and Pakistan, agriculture is 
becoming ever more crowded. Farmers must expand into new areas because their is not 
enough land to maintain living standards in traditional agriculture without expansion. 
They cut back on rotation or increase the number of crops because there is simply not 
enough food production with traditional timing. In areas such as Oman and Yemen, the 
problems are not from population pressure, but from lack of manpower in rural areas to 
maintain traditional agricultural systems. Families can achieve higher living standards 
by sending family members to work abroad and using labour-saving pumps at home. 
With labour migration, families are better off even if they do not farm at all. 
To have an impact, policy must offer rural people tangible benefits now or the 
realistic hope that benefits will come soon. People will not support initiatives that seem 
to have only cost without providing anything in return. Livestock policies must protect 
wealth and security represented by herds, because herders will not voluntarily give up 
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vegetation must have some value to nomads if left in place, as well as if used for 
firewood. Living standards of farmers must be raised so that they do not need to 
expand into marginal areas, over-irrigate, or over-crop. Fields must produce as much 
income even if not cropped as intensively. Using and maintaining traditional systems 
must yield as much income as sending labour abroad and utilising pumps at home. 
Usually, a whole package of economic policies is needed, along with technical 
and regulatory methods for dealing with desertification. Exactly what policies will 
work depends, of course, on economic and social conditions in specific countries. 
Many countries may need to introduce market reforms, so that farm-gate prices 
increase, allowing rural people to improve living standards without having to expand 
agriculture or herding. Subsidies may be needed to encourage environmentally 
beneficial actions, such as payment for maintaining terraces and irrigation systems, or 
for protecting and tending trees. Policies must be very carefully implemented. Simply 
making farming more profitable can increase environmental degradation if policies are 
not carefully thought out. Similarly, livestock subsidies may simply encourage herd 
growth. 
Whatever the policy, though, the basic principle is that rural people must benefit 
immediately. Environmental protection must become more important to them in the 
short-term than their current, destructive activities. If proper policies are implemented, 
rural producers will become enthusiastic allies in preserving arid and semi-arid 
environments. After all, they know better than anyone that it is in their interest to 
preserve their environment, if they can do so without sacrificing their short-term 
chances for survival. Planners must begin to view rural people as allies in the fight 
against desertification, and allies need support so that they can help more effectively. 
In most arid regions, the world needs all the help it can get in holding back the desert. 
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